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Abstract
Asian foreign direct investments are significant in the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Statistics compiled by the OECD’s new balance of
payments manual (BPM6) show that the FDI stock of Asian investors is significantly
higher than the data on direct investors suggest, meaning that companies go through
intermediary countries before the investment reaches its final destination. The purpose of
the article is to analyse why Asian FDI invest through intermediaries rather than directly.
The paper analyses the main reasons for this “indirectedness” based on statistical data,
other sources and semi-structured interviews with automotive and electronics companies.
Our results show that the motivations for using an intermediary country can be manifold.
Tax optimisation is often the reason why a company goes through a country with a more
favourable regulatory environment. In addition, the geographical distance and global
production chain considerations can be important, as well as the aim of companies
from emerging countries to conceal the investor’s real origin. The increasing number
of acquisitions further enhances the share of indirect investments, as with the acquisition
of a foreign parent company the new owner also inherits its subsidiaries.
Keywords
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I. Introduction
After the transition process from the planned to the market economies started, with
different timing, all Visegrad countries opened up their economies to foreign direct
investments, realised by foreign multinational companies. While in the nineties there
was a clear dominance of multinationals from Western European and other developed
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countries (mainly the United States and Japan), later on multinationals from other non-
developed countries, among them Asian companies, started to discover this destination
for their foreign direct investments. (Kaliszuk, 2016), for example, shows the different
timing and paths of South Korean and Chinese FDI in Poland.) Important projects realised
in the Visegrad countries by Asian investors include those by companies from Japan
(Matsushita, Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Sanoh, Alpine, Sumitomo, Panasonic and Asahi
Glass), Korea (Samsung, Hankook and Hyundai), China (Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo, Wanhua),
India (SMR, Apollo Tyres and Tata), Singapore (Patec) and Taiwan (Foxconn (Hon Hai)),
just to name a few. At present, Asian foreign direct investments are much more substantial
in these countries than we previously thought, which will be the first topic we deal
with in this article. These investors usually come through intermediary countries to the
Visegrad countries, which means that before reaching the final Visegrad destination, their
investments usually flow through another country or countries. Besides the geographic
distance, there can be other motivations for such an approach – this is the second topic we
deal with in this article. Based on company interviews conducted in Hungary and other
data collected from newspaper articles and specialised economic daily articles, we draw
up a list of the various motivations behind this intermediary nature of Asian foreign direct
investment in the Visegrad countries.
As the necessary statistics were not available and multinational companies used a range of
intermediary countries for FDI, the importance of Asian FDI in the region has remained
hidden to society and, in part, to the professional community. Our work aims to help
both decision-makers and researchers in exploring the extent of FDI from Asia and in
understanding their motivations for an indirect appearance in other nations.
As Hungary is representative of the Visegrad countries in terms of geographic position,
FDI attraction and level of development (GDP per capita), which are all important factors
when it comes to explaining FDI attraction, the experiences in Hungary can be generalised
to the Visegrad countries and to other countries in the region. After describing the role
of Asian foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Visegrad countries, the purpose of the
article is to analyse why Asian FDI comes through intermediaries rather than directly.
Our article is organised as follows. After the brief introduction, we present the data about
Asian FDI in the Visegrad countries. Next, we describe briefly our methodology and then
present the results of our research. In the last section we present our conclusions.
II. Asian FDI in the Visegrad countries
FDI data are now available according to the Ultimate Investing Country (UIC) principle,
where FDI is assigned to the country of the foreign investor that ultimately controls the
investments in the host economy (OECD, 2015). Thus, we have a clearer picture about
how much FDI from Asia is invested in the four Visegrad countries: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Previously, FDI data were broken down according to the
nationality of the immediate investor, and as Asian multinationals quite often go through
other countries before the investment reaches its final destination, this resulted in a low
value and share in total for Asian FDI in the Visegrad group. The latest BPM6 FDI data
are available for the analysed countries for 2017, and they are broken down according to
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ultimate investors and according to direct investors (Table 1). This enables us first to gain
a more accurate picture of the real extent of Asian FDI in the four analysed countries, and
what the main source countries are in that respect. Furthermore, we are able to show the
difference between FDI coming directly from Asia and the overall stock of FDI of Asian
origin in the Visegrad region, and thus the level of inclination of Asian investors to go
through intermediary countries. Additionally, we can go down to the country level to show
differences between the two values as well as between the investor countries. Unfortunately,
Slovakia presents data according only to the direct investors’ country breakdown, thus it
is left out of certain analyses. However, according to Grešš (2019), China, Taiwan, South
Korea and Japan are important Asian investors in Slovakia. On the other hand, according
to FATS data of the Eurostat, the number of Asian-owned companies in Slovakia is very
small compared to the other three Visegrad countries (for Chinese and Hong Kong-owned
companies see Sass (2019), for their negligible share in total FDI see Pleschová (2017)).
Table 1: FDI stock by leading Asian investor countries in the Visegrad countries, 2017 (million
USD)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
direct ultimate direct ultimate direct ultimate direct ultimate
Japan 1907.66 3314.14 1152.56 3185.93 887.43 4996.26 125.16 n.d.
Korea 3254.71 3046.01 1979.25 1986.48 1134.81 1783.54 3535.08 n.d.
China 707.27 1096.04 210.96 1973.42 223.11 826.51 55.12 n.d.
Hong Kong, China 115.69 204.41 319.81 207.51 347.08 465.06 25.03 n.d.
India −1.12 99.51 −16.04 2657.56 103.38 299.41 −2.72 n.d.
Singapore 344.64 699.07 532.29 −55.72 84.74 109.56 118.49 n.d.
Chinese Taipei 283.53 1007.46 47.28 971.91 30.76 254.14 18.27 n.d.
Sum of 7 countries 6612.36 9466.65 4226.11 10927.09 2811.31 8734.48 3874.42 n.d.
Sum of 7 countries
in % of total FDI
stock
4.42 6.33 4.64 12.01 1.18 3.66 6.94 n.d.
Source: OECD FDI positions by partner country BMD4: Inward FDI by immediate and by ultimate
investing country and Hungary: Hungarian National Bank
Asian FDI is considerably greater according to the data on the ultimate owners’ country
compared to the direct owners data in all three Visegrad countries for which data are
available – based on that, we can assume that the case is so in Slovakia as well. Differences
between the direct and ultimate data are large, especially in Hungary and Poland.
According to the data, the leading Asian investors differ in the three countries: while
Japan is the top investor in all three countries, Korea is second in the Czech Republic
and Poland, but only third in Hungary, while this country may be the leading investor
in Slovakia. Hungary has very substantial FDI stock originating from India, which is its
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second largest investor country. China ranks third (in the Czech Republic and in Poland)
or fourth (in Hungary). Chinese Taipei ranks fourth in the Czech Republic and fifth in
Hungary.
In terms of their share in total, the seven leading Asian investor countries represent more
than 12% of all FDI in Hungary, more than 6% in the Czech Republic (and most probably
in Slovakia) and more than 3% in Poland. In all cases their share is considerably larger
according to the ultimate owners’ country than according to the direct owners’ country.
The difference is the largest in the case of Hungary; where Asian investors appear to be
the most inclined to go through intermediary countries.
Figure 1: FDI stock of the leading Asian investors in Visegrad 3 (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland), 2017 (million USD)
Source: own calculations based on OECD FDI positions by partner country BMD4: Inward FDI by
immediate and by ultimate investing country and Hungary: Hungarian National Bank
Based on the summarised Asian country level data (Figure 1), Korean, Hong Kong and
Singapore multinationals usually invest directly from their home countries, as in their case
the difference between the data according to the ultimate and direct investor countries is
the smallest. On the other hand, the FDI of Japanese, Chinese and especially Indian and
Chinese Taipei multinational firms usually passes through another country (or countries)
before reaching its final destination in a Visegrad country. In the literature there are
some hints at this “indirectedness” of Asian FDI in the Visegrad countries. Szabo (2019)
noted that many outside-European investors come through a European country (usually
the Netherlands or Luxembourg) to the Visegrad countries. The same is shown by Varga
(2018). EIAS (2014) showed that Taiwanese (Chinese Taipei) FDI to Europe, and to its
main Central and Eastern European (CEE) destinations of Czech Republic, Hungary and
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Poland, may flow through the Netherlands. Sass (2019) showed that Chinese investments
usually go through an intermediary country before they arrive in a Visegrad country.
Going down to the company level, we found interesting cases where the Asian investor
went through an intermediary country before reaching its final Visegrad destination. For
example, the Hungarian Samsung subsidiary is the parent of subsidiaries in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia (and Romania) of the Korean firm, thus there the Korean company
is present indirectly, through Hungary. On the other hand, Samsung invested directly in
Hungary, i.e. its FDI originates directly from Korea (Sass, 2016).
Two Indian companies, Apollo Tyres and Sona, invested in Hungary indirectly, through the
Netherlands, while Tata is a direct investor, thus its FDI comes directly from India into the
Visegrad countries. The Chinese Huawei realises its investments in the Visegrad countries
mainly through its Dutch subsidiary (Sass et al., 2019). McCaleb (2018) describes the
route of Chinese FDI to Poland, going usually through Hong Kong, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc.
It is obvious that for certain multinationals, it is important to sandwich an intermediary
country between the original and final destination of its investments. Our main area of
investigation is why is this so? What can be the main motivation of going through an
intermediary country when establishing a foreign subsidiary?
III. Methodology
In order to find out what the main motivations can be for using intermediary countries in
Asian direct investments realised in the Visegrad countries, we conducted interviews with
managers of ten Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean-owned subsidiaries in Hungary.
The choice of Hungary is supported by the fact that it is a relatively important host to
Asian investments in the Visegrad group and it has the largest difference between FDI
coming directly and ultimately from Asia. There are four Japanese, three Chinese, two
Indian companies and one Korean firm in our sample. The semi-structured interviews
were conducted by the authors between December 2016 and December 2019 (Table 2).
All interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality. The answers were noted down by the
authors in detail and were then analysed. The number and length of interviews did not
justify the use of qualitative data analysis software or applying any coding techniques.
We asked the following questions during our semi-structured company interviews:
1. What are the main characteristics of the company (year of establishment, year of
establishment in Hungary, ownership structure, changes in ownership structure,
entry mode)?
2. What is the country of the ultimate owner of the investment and of the direct owner
of the investment? If these two differ – what is the reason for that?
3. What were the main reasons for selecting Hungary for the location of the investment?
4. How independent is the subsidiary in terms of making decisions?
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We have to note that our access to the subsidiaries in question was not without problems.
In certain cases, it took a long period of time and negotiations to get in touch with the
management of the companies in question (usually with the help of an intermediator,
for example a representative of an industry association, of a ministry etc.). This limited
access explains the low number of companies in our sample and the fact that our sample
is not representative. However, we were able to access some “flagship” Asian-owned
subsidiaries in Hungary, some companies that are present in another Visegrad country as
well, and some of minor importance; that is why we believe our results based on the “mix”
of companies in our sample are generalisable. Information from the company interviews
was supplemented by data from the balance sheets and webpages of the subsidiaries.
Table 2: Details of the interviews conducted in the framework of the research
Company
No.
Year of establish-
ment/acquisition
Entry mode Number of
employees at present
Date of interviews
1 1989 greenfield 2500 permanent +
500 seasonal
12 April 2017
2 2005 greenfield 330 (white-collar,
directly) + 2500
(blue-collar,
indirectly)
4 times between
the winter of 2016
and April 2017
3 1991 greenfield 3000 permanent +
200 seasonal
April 2017
4 One in 2009;
Second in 2011;
Third in 2016
brownfield 2400 altogether January 2017
5 2006 brownfield 850 altogether December 2016
6 2017 acquisition
(the acquired
plant was
established
through
a greenfield
investment)
2000 April–May, 2019
7 1998 greenfield 650–700 May, 2019
8 2017 brownfield 260 May, 2019
9 1997 greenfield 4000 September, 2019
10 2006 greenfield 180 December, 2019
Source: own compilation based on company interviews conducted in the framework of the research
DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review, 11 (3), 239–252
DOI: 10.2478/danb-2020-0014
245
The subsidiaries we interviewed employ a total of about 19,500 people in Hungary. This
accounts for 12.2 percent of all workers employed in the sector4, taking into account the
employment statistics of categories Computer, electronics, optical product manufacturing
(which is a common category according to the TEÁOR classification), and motor vehicle
manufacturing activities. If the comparison is made with the employment statistics of
foreign subsidiaries, the companies surveyed account for 15.1 percent of total sectoral
employment.5
Our qualitative research justifies why we rely on company interviews: in-depth information
on the various motivations to invest indirectly could only be obtained through interviews.
This type of methodology of relying on interview-based company case studies has both
advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that we have obtained detailed quantitative
and qualitative data in the analysed areas and on their development over time. At the same
time, a drawback of our methodology is that the low number of companies in the sample
and their industries do not allow us to generalise our conclusions.
IV. Results of our research
The “real” home country of the foreign investor and the direct investing country may
differ from each other – and this seems to be increasingly true over time. Since the
1990s, there has been an increase in indirect FDI where the ultimate and direct source
countries differ from each other (Antalóczy and Sass, 2015). According to estimations,
indirect FDI can represent up to one third of the total FDI stock in the world economy
(Damgaard and Elkjaer, 2017). This of course raises the question of the reliability of
FDI statistics as well. In Europe, the offshore centres, which play the intermediary role
between the ultimate home country and the host country of the investment and usually
serve tax optimisation purposes, own 11% of foreign-owned EU companies (European
Commission, 2019). Our region is also affected by this problem, as was shown by Altzinger
and Bellak (1999). There are very few research studies, which examine the motivations of
indirect FDI. According to Kalotay (2012), the reasons for using an intermediary country
can be: tax optimisation, better knowledge of and/or geographic proximity to the final
destination economy, concealing the real origin of the investment or nominating a regional
headquarter, which then is the owner of all regional FDI. According to Andreff (2016), the
use of intermediary countries is especially characteristic of emerging multinational firms.
The stronger Asian presence than previously thought raises several questions. What can
be the motivations of investors for using intermediary countries? Could there be another
special reason, independent of the corporate strategy, for investing indirectly from the
home country of the multinational company? In this article, we look for answers to these
questions based on information from company interviews and other data sources.
The Hungarian subsidiaries of the Asian multinational companies in the sample are charac-
terised by the following features in terms of our topic.
4 KSH (2018).
5 KSH (2017).
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Table 3: Characteristics of the companies in our sample by the use of an intermediary country
and type of the entry mode
Company Has it come directly or
through an intermediary
country?
If it came through an
intermediary country,
which is that?
Entry mode:
greenfield or
acquisition
1 direct greenfield
2 through intermediary Netherlands greenfield
3 direct greenfield
4 through intermediary Cyprus acquisition
5 through intermediary Netherlands acquisition
6 through intermediary Luxembourg acquisition
7 through intermediary Hong Kong, China greenfield
8 through intermediary Switzerland acquisition
9 through intermediary Netherlands greenfield
10 direct greenfield
Source: own compilation based on the company interviews
Based on our relatively small sample, we can confirm what is reflected at the macro-
level FDI data published by the Hungarian National Bank: Indian, Japanese and Chinese
investors are more likely to invest in Hungary through an intermediary country, while
Korean multinational companies almost always invest directly from their home country.
(Actually, this is more or less true for the other two Visegrad countries, for which data
are available in Table 1: for Korean investors, the difference between the direct and the
ultimate data is minor in the three Visegrad countries, while for Indian, Japanese and
Chinese investors the difference is substantial.) In our sample, investment in Hungary
through intermediary countries is significant: eight out of ten companies chose this option6.
Investors from less developed countries may also aim to conceal the true nationality of
the investor (Kalotay, 2012); in addition to geographical distance, this may also contribute
to the use of an intermediary country. Chinese and Indian investors also tend to flow
through different tax havens or countries with favourable tax opportunities (this is shown
for BRICS7 by Andreff (2016), for India by Pradhan (2017), for China by Seaman et al.
(2017), Huang and Xia (2018) and the European Commission (2019), and here too the
motivation to conceal the true nationality of the owner may arise (European Commission,
2019). In general, investment from Japan and South Korea is much less characterised by
this aim of hiding the real origin of the investment (Table 4).
6 The country of origin of the investors is not disclosed due to the anonymity promised to the interviewed
companies.
7 The BRICS abbreviation refers to the following countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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Table 4: Japanese and South Korean FDI in offshore centres in percentage of the total outward
FDI, 2017
Share of offshore centres in total outward FDI stock
South Korea 6.4%
Japan 3.5%
Note: Favoured offshore centres according to IMF (2014): Japan – Cayman Islands, Malaysia;
South Korea – Unpublished data for the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Guernsey,
Jersey, Macao, Malaysia, Palau, Panama (no published data is available in the case of the Bahamas,
Belize, Bermuda, Isle of Man, Seychelles and Samoa due to the low number of investor companies
and hence their identifiability).
Source: OECD (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=64220)
Related to the previous motivation and a much more important objective for investor
companies is tax optimisation. The relevance of this is supported by the fact that in six
cases in our sample, companies use European countries with favourable tax opportunities
as intermediary countries (Andreff, 2016; Antalóczy and Sass, 2015). The importance
of the Netherlands can be seen, where the so-called Dutch sandwich indicates that it is
worthwhile to set up a favourably-regulated Dutch subsidiary between the investor’s home
country and the host country (Antalóczy and Sass, 2015). (In the case of Company 7,
Hong Kong is the intermediary country, which also is favourably taxed, but the company
originally came to Hungary directly from the home country when it first appeared. We
have to note that in this case, the ultimate owner’s country is not China.) Varga (2018)
also highlights the importance of the motivation of tax optimisation in case of capital
investment in the Visegrad countries from outside Europe. He shows that the role of non-
offshore developing countries among the main non-European partners is greater in terms
of the final origin of investments than in their direct origin.
In addition to tax optimisation, reducing other bureaucratic burdens in the home country
could also be an objective. In our sample, we see an example for this in the case of
Company 7, where the company headquarters were relocated from its home country to
Hong Kong. The company had already set up a Hong Kong subsidiary in 1986 and
has significant foreign capital investments, primarily in Asia. The headquarters were
transferred to Hong Kong only in 2004, with the aim of reducing the bureaucratic burden
for the international operations of the company.
In this context, due to the low number of cases, we can draw a tentative conclusion that
acquisitions cause an appearance rather through an intermediary country, whereas for
greenfield investments, investors come directly from the home country. Thus, the reason
why a multinational company indirectly appeared in Hungary was the acquisition of
another (non-Hungarian) multinational company that had subsidiaries in Hungary. Thus,
the new owner inherited the Hungarian subsidiaries of the third country company by
acquiring their direct parent company. In this case, the Asian investor also appears through
an intermediary country in Hungary, but for the practical reasons mentioned above. In
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our sample, the foreign (German) parent company of Company 4 was acquired by an
Indian multinational company, while Company 6 was also acquired by a Chinese company
through several acquisitions, thus becoming the owner of the Hungarian subsidiary of an
Asian company. Here it was not the parent company but the subsidiary itself that was
acquired. Thus, the real motivation for foreign investment is not related to the direct entry
or entry through an intermediary country (as in the case of tax optimisation), but, another
reason can be, as in the case of Company 6, that the acquisition of a competitor takes place.
(Nevertheless, the final European headquarters of the companies will remain in a country
with favourable taxes, such as Cyprus or Luxembourg.)
We find further examples of such “inherited” subsidiaries which, in practice, automatically
own the Hungarian company through an intermediary country (often the home country
of the previous owner of a multinational company). For example, China’s Yanfeng, which
was not among the companies interviewed, became a Hungarian investor through a merger
with the American Johnson Controls, meaning that the Hungarian factory, which was
owned by the US company, became 50 percent Chinese owned.8 Another interesting
example involves three Visegrad countries – among other economies. The Chinese Wanhua
Group acquired full control of the Hungarian BorsodChem chemical company in 2011
in a 1.2 billion euro deal.9 Thus, BorsodChem subsidiaries in other seven countries,
including the Czech Republic and Poland, which were beforehand the subsidiaries of
a Hungarian multinational firm, have become now indirectly owned subsidiaries of the
Chinese multinational.10
There may also be a link between the management of the acquisition, the integration of
the acquired company into a multinational corporate network and the existence of the
intermediary country. It may be particularly important to appoint a regional centre if the
value chains are predominantly organised on a regional basis under the leadership of the
multinational firm. It is assumed that this is the case in Company 1, since the company
came directly from the mother country; however, the Hungarian subsidiary is the parent
company of several regional subsidiaries, so in these countries of the region it appears
indirectly through the Hungarian subsidiary. In addition, the Western European production
units were gradually relocated to Central and Eastern Europe (within that mainly Hungary
and Poland), so relocation of the continental headquarters was also a reasonable option
in the given situation. Another such example can be those of the Japanese multinationals:
according to our interviews, while “smaller-sized” Japanese multinational firms (such
as for example Suzuki) come directly from Japan to the host country, large Japanese
multinational companies (such as for example Toyota) usually operate with continental or
regional headquarters. This results in a mix of direct and indirect presence of Japanese
multinationals, which is reinforced by our interviews. Furthermore, based on Table 1,
we can state that the situation seems to be the same in the Czech Republic and Poland.
The relevance of the continental organisation is also demonstrated by the fact that the
information collected during the interviews confirms the results of the literature that the
8 Content (2015).
9 Bryant (2011).
10 BorsodChem. Location/Contacts. Retrieved from http://www.borsodchem-group.com/Locations.aspx.
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main type of Asian FDI is market-seeking investment: by entering the Hungarian market,
Asian companies not only gain access to the European Union (and domestic) markets
but also to markets of Commonwealth of Independent States, Mediterranean countries
and EFTA (European Free Trade Association). During the interviews, representatives of
almost all the companies emphasised that their presence in Central and Eastern Europe
was to join their existing business in Western Europe or to strengthen their European
market position in the broader sense.
All in all, although the motivation for tax optimisation dominates, there are other reasons
that may play a role in the use of the intermediary country, which we have found to be
very common in the case of Asian investing countries, and especially in the case of the
emerging countries.
The examples above illustrate the need to differentiate the cases not only according
to the use or non-use of the intermediary country but also the motivations and so
the actual execution of the transaction is important. The examples of Yanfeng and
BorsodChem/Wanhua draw attention to the fact that indirect FDI is a result of acquisition.
In the case of acquisitions, we also find differences depending on whether the parent
company has been acquired itself or only one subsidiary has been bought. In the latter
case, the new parent can invest directly or indirectly, while in the former case (acquisition
of the parent) it is always indirect. As the number of mergers and acquisitions in the EU
is increasing (European Commission, 2019), the role of such inherited subsidiaries can be
expected to grow.
The time factor also seems to be important. Due to our small sample, we can only
assume that companies investing directly in Hungary arrived in the country in the late
1990s and early 2000s (in the case of Company 7 the investment was inherently direct).
Meanwhile, as a result of the knowledge and experience accumulated in the companies,
and the companies’ efforts to optimise the global production chains and so to reduce tax
payments, their structure has become increasingly complex, with the location decisions
about headquarters and production activities resulting in a multi-country structure.
Last but not least, the prominent role of offshore centres should be mentioned. These
offer specific tax and regulatory advantages for the companies. (This may result in fiscal
erosion not only in the home country, but in all affected economies, including the host
and intermediary countries.) Cultural differences should be mentioned above all. While
Japanese companies do not use tax havens for tax purposes and Korean companies typically
do not, Chinese companies often do use tax havens.
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V. Conclusion
In the world economy, in Europe and in Hungary there has been an increase in Asian
investments in the last decades. Their true extent can be specified based on the new FDI
data published for the years after 2014, which present these data according to both the
ultimate owner and the direct owner of the investment. Based on these new data we can state
that first, the extent and share of Asian FDI in total is larger in the Visegrad countries than
we had previously thought and second, that Asian investors, compared to their European
counterparts, are more inclined to pass their investments through a third country, before it
reaches its final location. Thus they come to the Visegrad countries mainly indirectly, via
intermediary countries.
In our article, based on company interviews, we wanted to analyse what the reason
can be for this “indirectedness”. We conducted interviews with leading managers of
ten subsidiaries of Asian multinationals in Hungary. We deem that the reasons for
indirectedness can be similar in the other three Visegrad countries.
According to our results, the motivations for using an intermediary country can be
manifold. Besides the geographic distance, especially emerging multinational companies
may want to conceal their real origin by sandwiching in an intermediary country
between the host and ultimate home country. Furthermore, production organisation reasons
may also matter, especially in global value chain related activities. We found the tax
optimisation reason quite widespread, sometimes going together with the motivation of
decreasing bureaucratic burdens. In the case of the Visegrad countries, the role of inherited
subsidiaries can also be important: when an Asian multinational firm acquires the parent
firm, it inherits its subsidiaries in the Visegrad countries – and this practical reason results
in the use of an intermediary country.
We conducted interviews with a total of ten Asian subsidiaries, in which we interviewed
senior executives with relevant knowledge and employees working for the company for
several years. However, there can be a selection bias concerning the firms, as there is a low
number of firms in our sample and we interviewed companies operational in two industries:
automotive and electronics only. That is why our results may not be generalisable. Another
limitation of our work is that we only interviewed Hungarian subsidiaries, and we only
met with the staff of the subsidiaries (both foreign and Hungarian employees were asked)
and did not directly seek the opinion of the parent company’s decision makers.
However, these also indicate avenues for further research. Besides these possible extensions
of our research, we can also analyse whether there is a difference between the host country
impact and the different characteristics of firms (way of operation, performance etc.)
coming directly vis-à-vis those that invest indirectly. There can be differences according
to the industries and activities as well, especially in services. The limitations and the
new and relevant research questions indicate that our present work is only one of the first
steps in exploring the motives and consequences of using an intermediary country during
foreign direct investments.
DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review, 11 (3), 239–252
DOI: 10.2478/danb-2020-0014
251
Acknowledgement
The authors are grateful for financial support provided by the PAIGEO Fund. Magdolna
Sass’s research was also supported by the Hungarian Research Fund NKFIH (no. 132442),
while Ágnes Szunomar’s research was supported by the Bolyai János Research Fellowship
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the New National Excellence Program (ÚNKP-
20-5-CORVINUS-29).
References
Altzinger, W., Bellak, C. (1999). Direct versus Indirect FDI: Impact on Domestic
Exports and Employment. Working Paper Series: Growth and Employment in Europe:
Sustainability and Competitiveness No. 9. Vienna University of Economics and Business
Administration, Vienna, November.
Andreff W. (2016). Outward Foreign Direct Investment from BRIC countries: Comparing
strategies of Brazilian, Russian, Indian and Chinese multinational companies. The
European Journal of Comparative Economics, 12(2), 79–131.
Antalóczy, K., Sass, M. (2015). Through a glass darkly: the content of statistical data on
foreign direct investment. Studies in International Economics: Special Issue of Külgaz-
daság, 1(1), 34–61.
Bryant, C. (2011). Wanhua takes full control of Borsodchem. Retrieved from
https://www.ft.com/content/1aadca66-2e2e-11e0-8733-00144feabdc0.
Content, T. (2015). Johnson Controls, Yanfeng form world’s largest auto parts
supplier. Retrieved from https://eu.ydr.com/story/money/business/2015/10/29/johnson-
controls-yanfeng-form-worlds-largest-auto-parts-supplier/74802082/.
Damgaard, J., Elkjaer, T. (2017). The Global FDI Network: Searching for Ultimate
Investors. Working Paper – Danmarks Nationalbank 2 November 2017 – No. 120.
EIAS (2014). Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment into the European Union and its
member states. European Institute for Asian Studies, October 2014.
European Commission (2019). Foreign Direct Investment in the EU. COMMISSION
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Brussels, 13.3.2019. SWD (2019) 108 final. Retrieved
from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/march/tradoc 157724.pdf.
Grešš, M. (2019). Slovakia economy briefing: Foreign direct investment in Slovakia.
Available at https://china-cee.eu/2019/07/24/slovakia-economy-briefing-foreign-direct-
investment-in-slovakia/.
Huang, B., Xia, L. (2018). China | ODI from the Middle Kingdom: What’s next after the
big turnaround? BBVA Research. Economic Watch. Retrieved from https://www.bbva-
research.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/201802 ChinaWatch China-Outward-Invest-
ment EDI.pdf.
IMF (2014). Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs): IMF Staff Assessments. Retrieved from
https://www.imf.org/external/NP/ofca/OFCA.aspx.
Kaliszuk, E. (2016). Chinese and South Korean investment in Poland: a comparative study.
Transnational Corporations Review, 8(1), 60–78.
252 Andrea S. Gubik, Magdolna Sass, Ágnes Szunomár: Asian Foreign Direct Investments
in the Visegrad Countries: What Are Their Motivations for Coming Indirectly?
Kalotay, K. (2012). Indirect FDI. The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 13(4),
542–555.
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